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Abstract
Latent inhibition (LI) is a startlingly simple effect in which preexposure of a stimulus without consequence retards subsequent
responding to a stimulus–consequence relation. The effect was first demonstrated with Pavlovian conditioning in animals and
was later suggested to be a marker of human psychopathology such as schizophrenia. Individual differences in LI has supported
the continued use of animal models to understand humanmental health. In this review, we ask whether there is sufficient evidence
to support the continued application of LI from animal models to human psychopathology because of the weak evidence for LI in
humans. There is considerable variability in the methods used to assess LI, sustaining different theoretical accounts of the effects
observed, which differ from the accepted accounts of LI as demonstrated in animals. The review shows that although there have
been many experiments testing human LI, none provide the necessary experimental controls to support the conclusion that
retarded responding is caused simply by preexposure to a stimulus, as has been demonstrated with animal models. Establishing
this conflict, we set out a framework for future research.
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Learning from experience involves acquiring connections or
associations between stimuli and outcomes in our environment.
Such learning allows the memories associated with stimuli we
encounter to guide actions and predict outcomes. For instance, if
Jo drives the same route towork each day, the actions required to
navigate the route safely become automatic, cued by familiar
stimuli along the way. Through experience, Jo has learnt asso-
ciations so that the stimuli in her environment can activate mem-
ories to prompt efficient instrumental responses. Learning these
regularities so that stimulus–action memories are activated in
different situations is adaptive, facilitating efficient responding
to achieve motivated outcomes. However, while learnt associa-
tions help us respond when conditions are similar to the past,
they can slow down our ability to form new associations and
adapt to new situations; they can also make us less flexible.
One way to investigate cognitive and behavioral flexibility
is to examine how prior experiences influence learning. In this
review, we focus on the specific case of stimulus preexposure.
Preexposing a stimulus in the absence of an outcome retards
subsequent responding to the same stimulus if it is trained to be
a predictor of an outcome (Lubow, 2010; Lubow & Moore,
1959). The effect, first labelled the CS preexposure effect and
then the more theoretically laden label latent inhibition (LI),
was reported first with laboratory animals (e.g., Baker &
Mackintosh, 1979; Lubow, Markman, & Allen, 1968; Lubow
& Moore, 1959; Rescorla, 1971) and, subsequently, with
humans (e.g., Ginton, Urca, & Lubow, 1975). This effect of
preexposure illustrates that previous regularities influence cur-
rent behavior and demonstrates a limit to cognitive and behav-
ioral flexibility. However, while there have been many tests of
LI in humans, it is unclear whether they provide a simple mea-
sure of the effect of stimulus preexposure on current behavior.
Through this review, we aim to evaluate the human LI research
and ask what tests of human LI are measuring.
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It is unclear what experimental tests of human LI are mea-
suring. This question is particularly important in the context of
continued interest in individual differences in the LI effect.
The LI effect received considerable research interest following
the observation of individual differences in human tests of LI
(for further discussion, see Byrom & Murphy, 2018). Some
individuals show a reduced LI effect, showing no effect of
preexposure but rather adaptation of behavior to respond to
a stimulus when a new stimulus–outcome association is
trained. The absence of a preexposure effect has been de-
scribed in individuals with acute schizophrenia (e.g., Baruch,
Hemsley, & Gray, 1988a; but see also Schmidt-Hansen & Le
Pelley, 2012), high levels of schizotypy (e.g., Lubow, Ingberg-
Sachs, Zalstein-Orda, & Gewirtz, 1992; Baruch, Hemsley, &
Gray, 1988b; Gray, Fernandez,Williams, Ruddle & Snowden,
2002), acute and chronic stress (Braunstein-Bercovitz,
Dimentman-Ashkenazi, & Lubow, 2001; Braunstein-
Bercovitz, Rammsayer, Gibbons, & Lubow, 2002), high
levels of creativity (Burch, Hemsley, Pavelis, & Corr, 2006;
Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2003), obsessive-compulsive
disorder (Kaplan et al., 2006; Lee & Telch, 2010; Swerdlow,
Hartston, & Hartman, 1999), and depression (Msetfi, Byrom,
& Murphy, 2017).
Disruptions to LI have been interpreted as indicative of
increased cognitive or behavioral flexibility (Burch et al.,
2006) as well as reflecting a weakening of the earlier memory
or shifting of attention and therefore a reduced ability to use
past regularities to guide learning (e.g., Hemsley, 1993). From
this perspective, in addition to providing insight into cognitive
and behavioral flexibility, LI has the potential to provide a
model of some components of psychological disturbance
(Weiner & Arad, 2009). Indeed, the interest in individual dif-
ferences in LI has contributed to the use of animal models of
LI to develop neurodevelopmental understanding of schizo-
phrenia (e.g., Jeevakumar et al., 2015; Meyer & Feldon, 2012;
Piontkewitz, Arad, & Weiner, 2012; Vuillermot et al., 2012)
and potential pharmacological interventions (e.g., Mizuno
et al., 2013; Piontkewitz, Arad, & Weiner, 2011; Singer,
Wei, Chen, Boison, & Yee, 2013; for a review, see Moser,
Hitchcock, Listers, & Moran, 2000; Weiner & Arad, 2009).
However, there is good reason to suggest that the nature of
effect recorded in animals is qualitatively distinct from that
observed in humans.
Researchers have begun to call into question the relation-
ship between LI and schizophrenia (Schmidt-Hansen & Le
Pelley, 2012) and the related trait measure of schizotypy
(Granger, Moran, Buckley, & Haselgrove, 2016). These arti-
cles draw attention to replication failures, specifically the fail-
ures to find evidence of weakened LI in individuals with
schizophrenia or high levels of schizotypy. Failures to repli-
cate individual differences in LI could indicate that the effect
in question is not Breal.^ However, replication failures can
also indicate statistical and power issues, or a failure to follow
previous procedure (Van Bavel, Mende-Siedlecki, Brady, &
Reinero, 2016). Replication failures highlight the sensitivity
of LI; changes in the methods used to test LI have had a
substantive influence on the observation of the effect and the
very nature of the effect being studied.
In the present review, we set out to consider the various
methods used to test LI. First, however, we introduce a brief
history of LI research to contextualize the main review.
A brief history of latent inhibition
Animal studies
At the time the first LI experiments were conducted, re-
searchers were interested in the mechanism by which learning
occurred in the absence of reinforcement (i.e., latent learning).
Performance of a rat navigating a maze could be improved by
providing reward (e.g., food). What was more difficult to ex-
plain was why prior exposure to the maze without reinforce-
ment could sometimes enhance or sometimes suppress learn-
ing once a reward was introduced. The effects of prior expo-
sure were explained in terms of latent learning. If learning
following preexposure involved acquiring new responses to
a stimulus, then responses acquired during the preexposure
phase could suppress new learning to the extent that the two
responses were in conflict (Thistlethwaite, 1951; Tolman,
1948) but enhance learning if they shared features.
In this context, Lubow and Moore (1959) measured the
interference created by nonreinforced preexposure to a single
stimulus, as is summarized in Table 1. They hypothesized that
latent learning was a response-mediated effect and that
preexposing a stimulus would allow for responses to that stim-
ulus to be learnt that would interfere with the subsequent ac-
quisition of new, alternate responses when the stimulus was
paired with a biologically relevant outcome (unconditioned
stimulus; US). Thus, they reasoned that the rate of condition-
ing (learning the new response) would be slower for a
preexposed stimulus than for a non-preexposed stimulus. In
line with their hypothesis, animals preexposed to a stimulus
took more trials to reach a criterion level of conditioned
responding than if the stimulus that had not been preexposed.
Table 1 Design of the Lubow and Moore (1959) study
Phase 1: Preexposure phase Phase 2: Test phase Number of trials
to criterion
10 × PE CSt→ no outcome PE CSt→ Outcome 26
NPE CSt→ Outcome 19
CSt = target conditioned stimulus; PE = preexposed; NPE = not
preexposed
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While Lubow and Moore (1959) measured the number of
trials to a criterion as an index of interference, the LI effect can
also be inferred by differences in the rate of change in behav-
ior. For example, Rescorla (1971) trained two groups of rats to
lever press for food (see Table 2). In Phase 1, the preexposed
group was exposed to the to-be-conditioned stimulus (CSt) in
the absence of an outcome, while the non-preexposed group
had no exposure to the stimulus. In Phase 2, both groups
received pairings of the conditioned stimulus (CSt) and the
outcome (O; electric shock). Rescorla predicted that pairing
the CSt with an aversive outcome would lead the animals to
freeze in the presence of the CSt (immobility is a common
behavior acquired to stimuli that precede aversive stimuli like
shock), and this would be incompatible with other behaviors,
like lever pressing for food pellets. As such, acquisition of the
stimulus–outcome association could be assessed by measur-
ing lever pressing in the presence of the CSt and comparing
this to the rate of lever pressing in the absence of the CSt, as
shown in Fig. 1. The suppression ratio (the ratio of the rate of
lever pressing in the presence of the CSt with the rate of lever
pressing in the absence and presence of the CSt) for all rats
started at around .5 (i.e., the rats were lever pressing equally in
the presence and absence of the CSt). Across Phase 2, the
suppression ratio fell toward zero, as rats ceased to press the
lever in the presence of the CSt. The rate of decline in the
suppression ratio was slower for the preexposed group. By
measuring the suppression ratio over trials, Rescorla showed
the interference effect of preexposure on a trial-by-trial basis.
Human studies
Latent inhibition has also been reported in human learning.
Using a comparable form of conditioning, Schnur and Ksir
(1969) observed an effect of preexposure on human eyelid
conditioning. Participants were preexposed to a CSt prior to
this being paired with an outcome (a puff of air delivered to
the eye) and a conditioned response (eye blinks) being mea-
sured. Illustrating an LI effect, participants who were
preexposed to the CSt were slower to acquire the conditioned
response than were participants receiving no preexposure or
preexposure to a different stimulus. This was all completed in
the presence of a masking task; participants were led to be-
lieve that the study required them to press buttons in response
to lights presented. The masking task had no relevance to the
LI task, and participants were not aware that the study was
assessing conditioned responses. Much of the research with
humans has employed masking tasks during the preexposure
phase nominally to engage the participants’ attention.
Subsequent human studies have described LI effects using
protocols extending beyond conditioned responding for appe-
titive and aversive stimuli, to preparations involving cognitive
processing for neutral stimuli (hence, we refer to stimuli in
these experiments as S rather than CS). For example, Lubow
et al. (1992) developed a visual learning task that has subse-
quently been used widely and adapted bymany other labs (see
BVisual^ task in Table 3 for a summary of this design). In
Phase 1, participants complete a masking task with visual
trigrams presented successively. Participants are required to
count the number of times a specific trigram occurs. For the
preexposed (PE) group, the masking task stimuli are
superimposed on the St (a shape). The non-preexposure
(NPE) group completes the masking task with no exposure
to the St. The stimuli from the masking task continue to be
presented through Phase 2, during which all participants are
presented with a discrimination task in which the St predicts
an outcome (increments on a score counter) while a novel,
nontarget stimulus (Snt) predicts no outcome. Participants
are required to respond to prevent the outcome from occur-
ring. As such, participants should respond in the presence of
St and withhold responding in the presence of Snt. The de-
pendent measure is the number of trials a participant takes to
reach a criterion of five consecutive correct responses to St
with no responses to Snt. Lubow et al. found that participants
took longer to reach the response criterion if they had been
preexposed to the St. Similar findings have been replicated in
many subsequent studies (e.g., Lipp, 1999; Swerdlow, Braff,
Table 2 Design of the Rescorla (1971) study
Group Phase 1:
Preexposure phase
Phase 2: Test phase
Preexposure group (PE) CSt→ no outcome CSt→ Outcome
No preexposure group (NPE) /
CSt = target conditioned stimulus
Fig. 1 Data redrawn from Rescorla (1971), showing change in
mean suppression ratio of Phase 2 trials for a preexposed and
non-preexposed group
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Hartston, Perry, & Geyer, 1996; Gray et al., 2001; Zalstein-
Orda & Lubow, 1995), suggesting that the LI effect might
generalize beyond standard conditioning protocols.
The psychological mechanisms underpinning LI
The LI effect, as discussed thus far, is retarded responding to a
stimulus that has been preexposed without consequence. As
Lubow and Gewirtz (1995) observed, LI is a simple phenome-
non. The empirical phenomenon is simply retarded development
of responding to a stimulus that might otherwise be expected
given the stimulus-outcome contingency. Despite this simplicity,
there are contrasting explanations for the psychological mecha-
nism including motoric or stimulus interference, attention, and
memory. We summarize these accounts briefly before returning
to the empirical effect to assess whether human tests of LI
achieve the necessary controls to conclude that retarded perfor-
mance is simply the result of stimulus preexposure.
Lubow et al. (1968) described the early observations of LI in
terms of response interference. During the first phase, an associ-
ation forms between the target stimulus and some form of re-
sponse or responses that accompany the sensory habituation.
This interferes with retrieval of an association between the target
stimulus and the new response acquired during Phase 2.
Subsequent retrieval-focused accounts have proposed that the
LI effect occurs because the acquisition of an association be-
tween the target stimulus and no outcome during Phase 1 inter-
feres with the retrieval of the association between the target stim-
ulus and outcome acquired in Phase 2 (Bouton, 1993; Miller &
Matzel, 1988; Miller & Schachtman, 1985). Such interference
accounts suggest that retarded performance can be observed de-
spite intact learning (e.g., Bouton, 1993). Supporting evidence is
provided by experiments showing that LI can be disrupted by
presenting the outcome in a different context (Kasprow,
Catterson, Schachtman, & Miller, 1984), or extinguishing the
context present in Phase 1 (Baker & Mercier, 1982; Grahame,
Barnet, Gunther, & Miller, 1994; but see also Hall & Minor,
1984; Zalstein-Orda & Lubow, 1995).
Evidence supporting the interference account also suggests
that LI may be context dependent, with changes in physical or
temporal context between the two learning phases reducing the
interference effect. For instance, the comparator hypothesis, as-
sumes that the association formed between the stimulus and the
context during Phase 1 interferes with the expression of the stim-
ulus–outcome association in Phase 2 (Escobar, Oberling, &
Miller, 2002; Miller & Matzel, 1988; Oberling, Gosselin, &
Miller, 1999). A similar assumption, of context dependence, is
inherent to Wagner’s (1981) standard operating procedures
(SOP). SOP is a memory model in which memory resources
are allocated on the basis of experience. Wagner proposed that
as the preexposed stimulus is correlated with the contextual cues
in Phase 1, it loses the ability to enter into association, slowing
future learning (see also McLaren & Mackintosh, 2000).
The LI effect may also reflect an overall or between-sessions
learning effect dependent on the aggregate contingency be-
tween S and outcome across both phases. Most LI protocols
present a perfect predictive relation between S and outcome in
Phase 2. However, integrating the Phase 1 contingency experi-
ence of the S followed by no outcome, with the Phase 2 con-
tingency, of a S followed by an outcome, will reduce the overall
S–outcome (S-O) contingency substantively (for further discus-
sion, see Baker, Murphy, & Vallée-Tourangeau, 1996; Le
Pelley & Schmidt-Hansen, 2010; Schmidt-Hansen & Le
Pelley, 2012). This is illustrated in Fig. 2 for an LI task includ-
ing 80 preexposure trials in Phase 1 (cell b), interspersed with
intertrial intervals (cell d) followed by Phase 2 training. Where
Phase 1 and Phase 2 are considered separately, the CS-O con-
tingency (ΔP) is zero in Phase 1 and one in Phase 2. Where
these two phases are combined, the overall CS-O contingency
in a non-preexposed condition remains one but is reduced to 0.2
in the preexposed condition. Therefore, the two phases provide
evidence consistent with a reduced overall relation.
So far, the explanations have centered on competing responses
or interfering or contrasting memory traces. Another approach
invokes attentional processes. Experience with a stimulus may
result in lowering attention directed to that stimulus, reallocating
processing resources away from the preexposed stimulus, resulting
in slowed learning (e.g., Lubow, 1989; Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce
& Hall, 1980). Hybrid accounts of stimulus associability
modulation have been developed, recognizing that both
previous relative predictive validity and repeated presen-
tations can influence stimulus associability (Le Pelley,
2004; Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010).
There are different accounts of the psychological mecha-
nisms underpinning the LI effect. LI can be explained in terms
of interference, attention, or memory. Perhaps because of the
evidence, there is no consensus for a mechanism underlying
LI. Further, and of direct relevance to this review, it is possible
that different psychological mechanisms are relevant for dif-
ferent demonstrations of LI. Here, we address issues related to
the methodology for assessing human LI. We further consider
whether the different methods that have been employed can
discriminate between the different psychological accounts.
Overview for tests of human LI
In a selective review of the literature, we identified 59 studies of
adult human LI that either focus on general mechanisms or indi-
vidual differences in LI. The majority (n = 52) report some form
of retardation in performance to the preexposed stimulus. There
is no denying that preexposing a stimulus can retard subsequent
responding to that stimulus when it is paired with an outcome.
However, while LI is descriptively simple, this simplicity has
proved to be a methodological challenge. Few of the human
experiments we reviewed simply preexposed a stimulus and then
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measured changes in performance. Human participants tend to
require explanation and instruction even regarding a simple stim-
ulus exposure experience. Such deviations from the simplest
design introduce confounds, creating alternate explanations for
the apparent retardation. This raises the question of whether any
of the existing human LI research provides the necessary exper-
imental controls to support the conclusion that the LI effect mea-
sured is caused simply by preexposure to a stimulus. We review
the extensive range of methods used to test human LI with the
aim of assessing whether human tests of LI have been able to
simply measure the effect of stimulus preexposure on
performance.
The studies we reviewed used 11 different experimental pro-
tocols. Further details of the eight more common protocols are
summarized in Table 3. The earliest of these protocols was the
auditory task that was run, almost universally, as a between-
subjects task (e.g., Allan et al., 1995; Baruch et al., 1988a,
1988b; Braunstein-Bercovitz & Lubow 2004; Ginton et al.,
1975; Gray, Snowden, Peoples, Hemsley & Gray, 2003;
Kumari et al., 1999; Lubow, Weiner, Schlossberg, & Baruch,
1987; Lubow et al., 1992; Serra, Jones, Toone & Gray, 2001;
Williams et al., 1996; Williams et al., 1998; Wuthrich & Bates,
2001), with the exception of two within-subjects designs (Gray,
Pilowsky, Gray, & Kerwin, 1995; Gray et al., 2003). The visual
task minimally adapted the auditory task and was widely used as
a between-subjects test of LI (e.g., De La Casa, Ruiz, & Lubow,
1993; Gray et al., 2001; Gray et al., 2002; Lipp, 1999; Lipp,
Siddle, & Arnold, 1994; Lubow et al., 1992; Rascle et al.,
2001; Swerdlow et al., 1996; Zalstein-Orda et al., 1995). In ad-
dition to the auditory and visual tasks, a number of studies have
used an electrodermal response procedure (e.g., Booth, Siddle, &
Bond, 1989; Björkstrand, 1990; Lipp et al., 1994; Lipp & Vaitl,
1992; Siddle, Remington, & Churchill, 1985; Vaitl et al., 2002).
There have been several infrequently used adaptations of
the visual task. Williams et al. (1996) developed a variant of
the visual task that employed a form of Stroop task (see also
Williams et al., 1997). Braunstein-Bercovitz and Lubow
adapted the LI visual task to include a flanker masking task
in Phase 1 (e.g., Braunstein-Bercovitz, 2000; Braunstein-
Bercovitz & Lubow 1998a, b). De La Casa and Lubow
adapted the visual task further to embed it within a prediction
task requiring participants to predict where on the screen the
  Outcome 
 Smulus Present Absent 
Panel A Present a b 
Absent c d 
    
Panel B  Phase 1 – Standard LI pre-exposure condion  
CSA  ~O : ΔP = 0 
Present 0 80 
Absent 0 220 
 Phase 2 – Standard LI 
CSA O & CSB  ~O: ΔP = 1 
Present 20 0 
Absent 0 120 
    
Panel C  Combined Phase 1 & 2 for a pre-exposure 
condion: ΔP = 0.2 
Present 20 80 
Absent 0 340 
 Combined Phase 1 & 2 for a non-pre-
exposure condion: ΔP = 1 
Present 20 0 
Absent 0 340 
Fig. 2 Three panels showing 2 × 2 contingency tables displaying the four
possible combinations of response − outcome information. The S-O
contingency is illustrated across three panels. Panel A shows a generic
overview for calculating S-O contingency. S-O contingency can be
viewed as a matric of four trial events, where a, b, c, and d represent the
frequencies of each S-O conjunction. Contingency is determined by the
difference between the likelihood of the outcome occurring in the
presence of the St [a/(a + b)] with the absence of the St [c/(c + d)]. A
normative model for the S-O contingency (Allan, 1980) takes the
difference between these two conditional probabilities ΔP = a/(a + b) -
c/(c + d). Panel B shows the S-O contingency tables for a preexposed
stimulus in Phase 1 and Phase 2 of a standard LI test. Panel C shows the
S-O contingency tables Phase 1 and Phase 2 combined for a preexposed
and non-preexposed stimulus
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outcome would occur, we refer to this task as the windows task
(e.g., De La Casa, 2002; De La Casa & Lubow, 2001).
Tsakanikos and colleagues provided a different visual LI proto-
col, requiring participants to find letter strings in moving color
blocks (Tsakanikos & Reed, 2004; Tsakanikos, Sverdrup-
Thygenson, &Reed, 2003).Most recently, Evans and colleagues
embedded a visual LI task within a simple letter prediction task,
in which participants have to learn which letters predict the oc-
currence of a letter X (Evans, Gray, & Snowden, 2007). This task
has been widely used to test individual differences in LI (e.g.,
Granger et al., 2016; Gal et al., 2009; Granger, Prados, &Young,
2012; Schmidt-Hansen & Honey, 2014; Schmidt-Hansen,
Killcross, & Honey, 2009; Shrira & Kaplan 2009).
As shown in Table 3, these protocols have differed in their
use of between-subjects and within-subjects designs, the types
of stimuli used, the task employed in Phase 1, the task
employed in Phase 2, the ratio of target to nontarget trials in
Phase 2, and the dependent variable. This range creates op-
portunities for variation in methods to influence experimental
findings. We assessed whether the protocols were sufficiently
simple to provide an unambiguous assessment of LI. Our dis-
cussion focuses upon three potential confounds: (a) the gen-
eral task procedure during preexposure, (b) the multiple con-
trol cues and their effects on relative novelty, and (c) the re-
sponse requirements and the dependent measures. Before ad-
dressing these, we set out a general review of variations in key
LI parameters.
Variation in key parameters
Almost all of the studies reviewed involved a two-phase de-
sign with one stimulus (St) presented without consequence in
Phase 1 prior to the same stimulus predicting an outcome in
Phase 2 (see Lipp, 1999, for exception). In all of the studies, a
comparison was made of Phase 2 performance for a
preexposed (PE) St and a non-preexposed (NPE) St, both of
which predict an outcome in Phase 2. Traditionally, tests of LI
are conducted with a between-subjects’ design, with one
group preexposed to St and a control group not receiving
preexposure (see Table 3; auditory, visual, Stroop, flanker,
Tsakanikos, and electrodermal tasks). Recent studies have
adapted the protocol to allow a within-subjects’ test (see
Table 3; windows and letter string tasks). Where studies have
adopted a within-subjects’ design, participants are presented
with two target stimuli in Phase 2, a PE St and anNPE St, both
of which predict the outcome. LI has been observed with both
between-subjects and within-subjects designs.
Many tests of LI also include a masking task (see
Table 3; auditory, visual, Stroop, and flanker tasks).
Lubow and Gewirtz (1995) argued that a masking task
in Phase 1 is necessary to engage the participants’ atten-
tion in controlled information processing and, in conse-
quence, leave the preexposed stimulus to automatic
processing (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin &
Schneider, 1977). This justification depends on the theo-
retical interpretation that LI is an automatic attentional
effect. Furthermore, Lubow and Gerwitz (1995) argued
that the Phase 1 masking task is necessary to reduce de-
mand characteristics; that is, human participants may have
an enhanced allocation of attention to cues during
preexposure because they are participating in an experi-
ment and may assume that all stimuli have a level of
experimental relevance. Thus, the masking task is
employed to reduce the likelihood of participants main-
taining artificially high levels of attention to the
preexposed stimuli. Both of these justifications for a
masking task have been critiqued (e.g., Escobar,
Arcediano, & Miller, 2003; Granger et al., 2016; Schmidt-
Hansen & Le Pelley, 2012). Recent studies including the letter
string task indicate that LI effects can be observed without a
masking task (Evans et al., 2007; Gal et al., 2009; Granger
et al., 2012; Granger et al., 2016; Schmidt-Hansen et al., 2009;
Shrira & Kaplan, 2009).
As LI refers to the effect of preexposure on subsequent
performance, the amount of preexposure may be expected to
be an important factor contributing to the magnitude of the LI
effect. While we may expect more preexposure trials to result
in a stronger LI effect, this is not necessarily the case. The
number of preexposure trials necessary to elicit a robust LI
effect may depend on the task and stimuli. Different experi-
ments have used different levels of preexposure. For instance,
while it is common to have 30 preexposure trials in the audi-
tory task (e.g., Baruch et al., 1988a, 1988b; Lubow et al.,
1992; Lubow et al., 1987; Swerdlow et al., 1996), 80
preexposure trials are included routinely in the visual version
of the task (e.g., Gray et al., 2001; Gray et al., 2002; Lubow
et al., 1992). LI only appears reduced when the number of
stimulus preexposures drops below 10 (e.g., Allan et al.,
1995; Williams et al., 1996, 1998).
Most protocols include a discrimination task in Phase 2,
such that a target stimulus (St) predicts the outcome while
other nontarget stimuli (Snt) do not (see Table 3; visual,
Stroop, flanker, Tsakanikos, windows, letter string, and
electrodermal tasks). This design contrasts with the original
auditory task, used by Ginton et al. (1975), which did not
include a discrimination; participants simply learnt that the
target stimulus predicted a paired outcome. While most
protocols have included both a St and Snt, there has been
variability in the preexposure of these stimuli. For example,
in Lubow’s original design only the St was preexposed. A
similar approach has been adopted in the auditory, visual,
flanker, and windows tasks. Other protocols pre-expose
both the St and Snt in Phase 1 (see Table 3; Stroop,
Tsakanikos, and letter string tasks). We discuss below
how this difference influences the relative novelty of the
NPE St.
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Are studies of human LI measuring only the effect
of stimulus preexposure?
If LI is only an effect of retarded performance following stim-
ulus preexposure, any test has to be able to demonstrate that
retarded performance is the result of stimulus pre-exposure
and cannot be explained by other factors. We argue that at
least three of the parameters varying between tests of human
LI have the potential to introduce substantive confounds: (1)
the task adopted in Phase 1; (2) the comparison between
preexposed (PE) and non-preexposed (NPE) target stimuli
(St), which we refer to as relative novelty effects; and (3) the
response requirements across the test and the dependent vari-
ables used to assess performance in Phase 2.
The Phase 1 task
Most studies of human LI have included some strategy to
ensure participant engagement during the first phase of the
task. We have identified three different approaches to engag-
ing participants during Phase 1: (1) a making task using stim-
uli distinct from the Phase 2 learning task, (2) consistent in-
structions across Phase 1 and 2, and (3) a task, independent
from the Phase 2 learning task, but directly involving the
stimuli to be presented in Phase 2. These second two ap-
proaches include a task to engage participants’ attention dur-
ing Phase 1, but do not introduce additional stimuli. The use of
these three approaches in the Phase 1 tasks is summarized in
Table 3. Both the first and second approaches, and some var-
iants of the third approach, create potential confounds for
assessing the effect of preexposure on subsequent task perfor-
mance, as outlined below.
Masking task The inclusion of a separate and distinct masking
task has been the most common approach to a Phase 1 task,
used by 39 of the studies we reviewed. As outlined in Table 3,
the auditory, adapted auditory, visual, Stroop, and flanker
tasks have included a distinct masking task. The masking task
is completed in Phase 1, and the masking task stimuli are
usually also present in Phase 2. For instance, with the auditory
task, the masking task consists of the presentation of an audi-
tory syllable list, and participants are required to count the
number of times that a specific syllable occurs (e.g., Ginton
et al., 1975). In the preexposure (PE) group, the St, a white
noise, is interspersed randomly between syllables. In Phase 2,
the syllable list is repeated with white noise interspersed be-
tween syllables for both the PE and NPE groups.
This approach bears some similarity to animal experiments,
such as Rescorla (1971), which also included a simultaneous
secondary task. In these animal experiments, that might be
considered the Bgold standard^ of LI, the subjects are engaged
in an ongoing and unrelated behavior (i.e., lever pressing for
food). Superimposed on this behavior is the multiple
presentation of an unrelated discrete auditory stimulus (CSt).
During Phase 2, the ability to learn about the CSt as a predictor
of an outcome is assessed. Rescorla found retarded acquisition
of this relation; however, notice that the CSt is presented with-
in a context involving actions (lever pressing) and outcomes
(food) that bear no relation to the CSt–outcome association
acquired in Phase 2.
Both human and animal tests of LI have included masking
tasks. However, not all human experiments have included a
masking task and the variability in methods leads to the pos-
sibility that different tasks are measuring different effects.
Further, there are several factors associated with the human
masking task that may introduce confounds and provide alter-
native explanations for the apparent LI effect. Specifically,
holding the masking task stimuli constant between Phases 1
and 2 provides preexposure to the masking task stimuli and
the context, effectively diminishing the novelty of these stim-
uli and thus accentuating the relative novelty of the NPE St.
We return to discuss this effect of relative novelty in detail
below.
By incorporating masking task stimuli in Phase 1, the pro-
tocol, involves an experimental requirement to shift attention
away from the preexposed stimuli (see Escobar et al., 2003,
for further discussion). This manipulation may create a nega-
tive priming effect (e.g., Graham & McLaren, 1998; Tipper,
1985, 2001). That is, during the preexposure phase, the
masking task stimuli are target stimuli and the PE St is effec-
tively a distractor to be ignored. This requirement, to ignore
the St, may suppress the internal representation of the stimuli,
reducing subsequent ability to recognize these stimuli (Tipper,
1985, 2001). In the second phase of the task, this relationship
is reversed, with the requirement to ignore the previously rel-
evant masking task stimuli and attend to the previously irrel-
evant PE St (Escobar et al., 2003; see also Tsakanikos et al.,
2003). Thus, effects of preexposure observed in LI protocols
including a masking taskmight be caused by negative priming
and reflect a delay in shifting attention from masking task
stimuli to the PE St.
Is this a problem? One could argue that outside of the
laboratory, most scenarios that reflect LI also include other
stimuli to which attention is directed. It is, however, important
to be able to recognize when an experiment has measured a
simple effect of preexposure compared with an effect of
switching attention. Where requirements to switch attention
are driving reduced performance, we should be considering
the relation to other similar effects, such as those of
extradimensional and intradimensional shifting (e.g.,
Slamecka, 1968). Importantly, while many experiments have
included masking tasks that introduce such a requirement to
shift attention, many others (discussed below) report retarded
performance with preexposed stimuli in the absence of this
requirement to shift attention. It is unclear whether these ex-
periments are measuring the same effect.
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Same instructions The second approach to engaging partici-
pants’ attention in Phase 1, employed with the letter string
protocol and Tsakanikos task, has been to use the same in-
structions during Phases 1 and 2. This approach was used by
eight of the studies that we reviewed. Here, during Phase 1,
the outcome, to be predicted, is presented so that it is not
predicted by any stimulus reliably (Gal et al., 2009; Shrira &
Kaplan, 2009) or is not presented at all (Escobar et al., 2003;
Evans et al., 2007; Granger et al., 2016; Granger et al., 2012;
Schmidt-Hansen et al., 2009; Tsakanikos et al., 2003). Efforts
to remove the masking task from tests of human LI have
improved the experimental design by simplifying the proto-
col. However, providing experience of the preexposed St be-
ing an unreliable predictor of the outcome, or a less reliable
predictor of the outcome than other stimuli, can change the
protocol from a direct test of LI (preexposure to a stimulus
without consequence), and instead set up a test of learned
irrelevance (LIRR; Bonardi & Ong, 2003), which is distinct
from LI. For instance, in Phase 1, Shrira and Kaplan (2009)
asked participants to respond when they thought the outcome
would occur. On successive trials, participants were shown a
St intermixed with other distractor stimuli. The outcome was
presented, but was not predicted by any stimulus reliably.
Experiments adopting such a procedure for Phase 1 provide
explicit opportunity for participants to learn that the St is an
unreliable predictor of the outcome. This learning alone, in-
dependent from simple stimulus preexposure, would be ex-
pected to retard subsequent performance (Baker &
Mackintosh, 1979; Bennett , Wills , Oakeshott , &
Mackintosh, 2000; Le Pelley & Schmidt-Hansen, 2010;
Mackintosh, 1973; Schmidt-Hansen & Le Pelley, 2012). For
instance, unreliable or invalid cues enhance the relative valid-
ity of other trained cues or even the context (e.g., Murphy,
Baker, & Fouquet, 2001). Thus, experiments presenting any
outcome during Phase 1 are inherently ambiguous, as retarded
performance may reflect either stimulus preexposure, a rela-
tive validity effect, LIRR, or a combination (see also Baker &
Mackintosh, 1979; Le Pelley & Schmidt-Hansen, 2010).
Where participants are instructed to expect the occurrence
of an outcome at the outset of the task, they may be encour-
aged explicitly or implicitly to encode the absence of the out-
come during Phase 1 as a meaningful event. Participants may
thus be likely to integrate their experience of an association
between St and no outcome from Phase 1 into Phase 2 to
generate an overall perception of a reduced predictive status
of the PE St compared to the NPE St (Schmidt-Hansen & Le
Pelley, 2012). Consider, for example, Escobar et al. (2003),
who removed the distinction between Phase 1 and 2, requiring
participants simply to observe a succession of stimuli before
making judgments about the predictiveness of the PE St and
NPE St. Participants were presented with 10 presentations of
an St followed by no outcome, after which the training sched-
ule continued without interruption to one presentation of the
same St followed by an outcome. In this protocol, integrating
the two phases alters the programmed contingency between
PE St and NPE St and the paired outcome, generating a stim-
ulus–outcome (S-O) contingency of 1/11 (.09) for the PE St
relative to 1/1 (1) for the NPE St (for further discussion, see Le
Pelley & Schmidt-Hansen, 2010; Schmidt-Hansen & Le
Pelley, 2012). Differences in the rates of responding to the
PE and NPE St in Phase 2 can be attributed here either to
preexposure to the St or sensitivity to the overall contingency
(e.g., Baker et al., 1996).
Informing participants about the outcome may encourage
them to learn a stimulus–no outcome association in Phase 1
and integrate this with their Phase 2 learning to reduce the
overall experienced contingency. However, removing infor-
mation about the outcome provides no guarantee that partici-
pants are not integrating the trial experience relevant to the
experienced contingencies across Phase 1 and Phase 2. Thus,
retarded performance with a preexposed St may be a result of
reduced S-O contingency. Attention-based accounts of LI as-
sume that this is not the case because participants have no
knowledge of the outcome in Phase 1 and should not be able
to acquire an association between the stimulus and no
outcome.
The contingency between stimulus and outcome is only
one factor influencing learning; other factors include surprise
(Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) and recency (Pineño & Miller,
2005). However, there is considerable evidence that animals
(Baker, 1976; Baker & Mackintosh 1979) and humans can
learn contingencies and that they can be learnt across phases
and across sessions (e.g., Baker et al., 1996; Baker, Murphy, &
Mehta, 2003). Importantly for this review, the LI literature has
so far overlooked the potential influence of contingency.
Existing tests of LI do not rule out the influence of contingen-
cy, creating ambiguity in terms of the psychological mecha-
nisms underlying the LI effect.
The role of contingency learning in the LI effect could be
tested. The standard LI test can be set out in terms of contin-
gency, as illustrated in Fig. 2. In current tests, the S-O contin-
gency differs between the PE St and NPE St. Participants who
are preexposed to the St experience a much lower S-O con-
tingency (Schmidt-Hansen & Le Pelley, 2012). One way to
isolate the influence of contingency on the effect of stimulus
preexposure would be to minimize the difference in S-O con-
tingency between preexposed and non-preexposed conditions.
If LI can be explained in terms of contingency, matching the
S-O contingency for PE and NPE conditions should eliminate
the difference in performance between the conditions.
Matching the contingency for PE and NPE conditions can
be achieved by changing the ratios of St and Snt trials. This
is possible because the overall contingency can be changed by
altering any individual component of the S-O contingency.
For example, to match the S-O contingency between the PE
and NPE conditions, the probability of the outcome occurring
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in the absence of the stimulus through Phase 2 can be manip-
ulated to decrease the S-O contingency in the NPE condition.
Alternatively, S-O contingency can be held constant while
preexposure is manipulated. For instance, the standard LI pro-
tocol presents a block of stimulus–no outcome (cell b) trials at
the start of the task, before introducing stimulus–outcome (cell
a) trials. If preexposure has an effect, over and above contin-
gency, the effect should be eliminated when cell b trials are
intermixed with cell a trials in a single phase.
Tasks involving the to-be-presented stimuli The third ap-
proach to engaging participants during Phase 1 has been to
instruct participants to engage with the stimuli to be presented
in Phase 2 by tracking the occurrence of a specific stimuli
(e.g., Granger et al., 2016), counting the number of stimuli
that appear (e.g., Shrira & Kaplan, 2009), making a judgment
about the stimuli (e.g., Tsakanikos & Reed, 2004), or reading
the stimuli out loud (e.g., Granger et al., 2016). This third
approach has been used with the letter string protocol and
Tsakanikos task (see Table 3) and was employed in five of
the studies we reviewed (De La Casa & Lubow 2001; Granger
et al., 2016; Schmidt-Hansen & Honey, 2014; Shrira &
Kaplan, 2009; Tsakanikos & Reed 2004).While this approach
may avoid many of the concerns discussed above, requiring
participants to track specific stimuli, such as counting the
number of times that a specific nontarget stimulus occurs,
might shift the participant’s attention away from the St, creat-
ing similar negative priming effects to those discussed above.
No Phase 1 task Many of the studies involving an automatic
electrodermal response have been conducted without a
masking task. In this sense, these tasks provide a relatively
unambiguous test of human LI, and it is worth noting that
several of these experiments report evidence of LI
(Björkstrand, 1990; Lipp et al., 1992; Siddle et al., 1985).
However, while we have included studies involving condi-
tioned skin conductance responses in this review, others have
raised concerns that these studies report a retardation of auto-
nomic responses that can be attributed to habituation to the
preexposed stimulus (Escobar et al., 2003). Habituation oc-
curs when repeated presentation of a single stimulus produces
a reduction in responding to the stimulus. Retardation of the
acquisition of skin conductance may reflect a peripheral pro-
cess of habituation, which is not necessarily an associative
process and has been dissociated from latent inhibition
(Hall, 1991).
Summary
In terms of the Phase 1 task, only simple tasks, involving the
to-be-presented stimuli (e.g., Granger et al., 2016; Shrira &
Kaplan, 2009) and tests including no Phase 1 task have met
the requirements of simplicity and avoided alternate
explanations for retarded performance. The corollary is that
many tests of human LI are ambiguous, and observation of
retarded performance with the preexposed target stimulus is
open to alternative interpretations.
Interestingly, where different approaches to the Phase 1
task have been employed within the same protocol, the effect
on task performance is minimal. For instance, within the letter
string and Tsakanikos tasks, two different Phase 1 tasks have
been employed: (a) using the same instructions in both phases
and hence accentuating the likelihood that participants inte-
grate the Phase 1 and Phase 2 contingencies; or (b) using a
task involving stimuli to be presented in Phase 2, minimizing
the likelihood of integrating Phase 1 and Phase 2 contingen-
cies. An LI effect was observed in both conditions with the
Tsakanikos task (Tsakanikos & Reed, 2004; Tsakanikos et al.,
2003) and the influence of the Phase 1 task in the letter string
protocol also appears to be similarly minimal (Granger et al.,
2016; Shrira & Kaplan, 2009). While the Phase 1 task thus
appears to have limited impact on the empirical LI effect,
different Phase 1 tasks introduce alternate mechanisms for
producing this effect, and it is not clear that the effect of re-
tarded performance with a preexposed stimulus is caused by
the same underlying mechanism or, indeed, whether retarded
performance can, in all experiments, be attributed exclusively
to the preexposure of a stimulus.
Relative novelty
Mismatches in stimulus novelty facilitate learning (e.g., Balaz,
Capra, Kasprow, & Miller, 1982; Lubow, Schnur, & Rifkin,
1976; Schmajuk, Lam, & Gray, 1996). A mismatch in novelty
can be created by presenting a novel stimulus in a preexposed
context, or by presenting a preexposed stimulus in a novel
context. In contrast, learning is expected to be impaired when
a preexposed stimulus is presented in a preexposed context.
Tests of LI attempt to measure the degree of performance
impairment induced by such preexposure. LI is measured by
comparing performance impairment with a preexposed stim-
ulus (PE St) to performance with a non-preexposed stimulus
(NPE St). The NPE St is usually a novel stimulus being pre-
sented in a preexposed context. Thus, for the NPE St there is a
mismatch in novelty which is expected to facilitate perfor-
mance. Importantly, this facilitation effect is more substantive
than presenting a novel stimulus in a novel context (e.g.,
Pearce & Hall, 1980; Schmajuk et al., 1996). Therefore, many
tests of LI confound effects of preexposure (of the PE St) and
novelty (with the NPE St). That is, rather than simply measur-
ing a preexposure effect, they also measure a relative novelty
effect.
The separate contributions of preexposure and relative nov-
elty are shown in Table 4. In tests of LI, performance with the
PE and NPE stimuli are compared. These stimuli are shown in
Table 4 as stimulus X (PE St) and stimulus Y (NPE St).
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Focusing on a comparison of PE and NPE St, Conditions 1
and 2 are treated as providing the same test of LI; both provide
an opportunity to compare a PE and NPE St. However, by
using non-preexposed distractors (Snt) in Condition 1, the
NPE St (Y) is not relatively novel. In comparison, in
Condition 2, as in most tests of LI, the distractor stimuli
(Snt) are preexposed, so that the NPE St (Y) is relatively
novel, in addition to not being preexposed.
The relative novelty confound exists in all experiments that
have maintained the masking task stimuli between Phases 1
and 2 (e.g., in the auditory, visual, Stroop, and flanker tasks).
When the NPE St is introduced at the start of Phase 2, it is
novel relative to all other stimuli (the masking task stimuli, the
contextual stimuli, etc.) Unfortunately, the confound of rela-
tive novelty has also influenced LI in the absence of a masking
task. Most tests of LI include a discrimination task in Phase 2,
with participants required to discriminate a target stimulus
from one or several nontarget stimuli (see Table 3). With a
discrimination task, preexposure to the Snt accentuates the
relative novelty of the NPE St, by ensuring that the context
in which the novel NPE St is presented is preexposed. As
summarized in Table 3, the Stroop H-mask task, Tsakanikos
task, and letter string task all preexpose the Snt. For example,
in the letter string protocol, at the start of Phase 2, the PE St
and all of the Snts have been preexposed. In contrast, the NPE
St is the only novel stimulus.
To our knowledge, no study has manipulated the relative
novelty of the NPE St systematically. However, both
Tsakanikos and Reed (2004) and Pineño, De La Casa,
Lubow, and Miller (2006) manipulated preexposure of the
Snt within a single study, changing the relative novelty of the
NPE St. Further, while most letter string protocols preexpose
the Snt (e.g., Evans et al., 2007; Granger et al. 2016; Schmidt-
Hansen et al., 2009; Shrira & Kaplan 2009), Gal et al. (2009)
changed the Snt between Phases 1 and 2 again, changing the
novelty of the NPE St. While the first two studies suggest that
relative novelty contributes to the LI effect (Pineño et al., 2006;
Tsakanikos & Reed, 2004), the third does not (Gal et al., 2009).
Pineño et al. (2006) observed relatively impaired performance
with a preexposed stimulus across a range of experimental
manipulations using a between-subjects design, but this was
not observed when the Snt was changed between Phases 1
and 2, reducing the relative novelty of the NPE St.
Tsakanikos and Reed (2004) reported a similar effect.
However, using the letter string task, Gal et al. (2009) changed
Snt between Phases 1 and 2, again reducing the relative novelty
of the NPE St, and found a strong LI effect, contrasting the
findings of the other two experiments.
Future experiments can and should control relative novelty.
The letter string task can be adapted to ensure the NPE St is
not relatively more novel than other stimuli. This is shown in
Table 4. Controlling relative novelty is essential to provide an
unambiguous measure of the effect of stimulus preexposure.
Response requirements and dependent variables
Response requirements The ratio of target (St) to nontarget
(Snt) trials reflects the proportion of trials on which partici-
pants are expected to respond. We may expect the ratio of
response to no response trials to affect the response accuracy
and themeasured LI effect (e.g., Donkers &VanBoxtel, 2004;
Kiehl, Liddle, & Hopfinger, 2000). However, while the ratio
of St to Snt trials has varied between experiments, no studies
have assessed the effect that varying this ratio has on the
strength of the LI effect systematically. Looking at variations
in the ratio of response requirements between experiments
using the same protocol, the ratio does not appear to have a
substantive effect.
More generally, the response requirements are not manip-
ulated across tests of LI (for exceptions, see Msetfi et al.,
2017; Nelson & Sanjuan, 2006). Almost all of the tests of
human LI that we reviewed here required participants not to
respond to the St in Phase 1 before learning to respond to the
St in Phase 2. Early explanations of LI focused on response
effects. Lubow et al. (1968) suggested that the stimulus–no
response association acquired in Phase 1 interfered with re-
trieval of the stimulus–response association acquired in Phase
2. While this was one of the very earliest explanations for LI,
tests of human LI have not manipulated the response require-
ments to dissociate the contribution of response learning.
Thus, the current human LI literature cannot rule out the pos-
sibility that retarded performance following preexposure is an
entirely behavioral effect.
Exploring the contribution that acquisition processes play
for the response phase might be achieved by manipulating the
Phase 1 and Phase 2 response requirements, for instance, re-
quiring participants to respond to stimuli predicting no
outcome in Phase 2 or setting up a task in Phase 1 that
Table 4 Tests of latent inhibition with and without relative novelty effects
Condition Phase 1:
Preexposure phase
Phase 2: Test phase
Condition 1:
No relative novelty effect
A, B, C, X X→ O; Y→ O; D, E, F
Condition 2: Relative novelty effect A, B, C, X X→ O; Y→ O; A, B, C
A, B, C, D, E, F, X and Y represent stimuli; O represents an outcome
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required participants to respond to the preexposed stim-
uli. This would allow stimulus–response and stimulus–
outcome associations to be manipulated between Phase
1 and Phase 2 independently.
Dependent variables While response requirements have not
been manipulated, several different dependent measures have
been used. In the introduction, we considered the benefit of
measuring the change in a suppression ratio over multiple
trials within animal studies of LI (Rescorla, 1971). This ap-
proach provided a more detailed dependent measure than the
trials-to-criterion measure used previously and captured a
comparison between the rate of responding in the presence
of the St relative to responding in the absence of the St.
Human tests of LI have used a variety of different dependent
measures, including trials to criterion, prediction of the out-
come likelihood, the total number of correct responses, mean
or median response time, or conditioned skin conductance
response. As we argue here, none of these dependent mea-
sures provides the same level of detail as described by
Rescorla (1971), and this limits our ability to assess whether
preexposure retards performance. Further, the range of depen-
dent measures limits our ability to make meaningful compar-
isons between protocols.
Trials to criterionThe trials-to-criterionmeasure has been used
widely, being adopted in the auditory, visual, Stroop, flanker,
and Tsakanikos tasks (see Table 3). This dependent measure is
the number of trials that it takes a participant to reach a certain
criterion of accuracy in Phase 2. It is a single dependent mea-
sure, combining response accuracy to the St and Snt. This
facilitates comparison between the preexposure and non-
preexposure conditions as well as assessment of individual
differences. However, with such simplification, important de-
tails about response accuracy are lost.
Take, for example, a participant who takes 16 trials to reach
criterion. It is not possible to tell whether this single number
reflects response accuracy in the presence of St or Snt. The
criterion usually adopted has been five consecutive correct re-
sponses to the St with no responses to the Snt. Because the St is
preexposed, it may be assumed that 16 trials to criterion reflects
slow acquisition of response accuracy to the St, prompting the
conclusion that it took 16 trials for the participant to start
responding to the St correctly. However, we cannot tell when
accurate responding to the Snt was established, and it may be
that it takes a similar amount of training to establish correct
responding to the Snt. Alternatively, correct responding to the
Snt might have been established early in training, before the
criterionwas reached. In this respect, the trials-to-criterionmea-
sure is uninformative about the number of trials taken to
achieve correct responding in the presence of the Snt.
Another problem is that 16 trials to criterion could reflect
the number of trials necessary to achieve correct responding in
the presence of the Snt. That is, it is possible for the participant
to have acquired correct responding to St rapidly, but continue
making errors, incorrectly responding to the Snt. In this way,
the trials-to-criterion measure might also be described as un-
informative about the number of trials taken to achieve correct
responding to St (Msetfi et al., 2017).
Indeed, it is not possible from the single measure to identify
whether differences in trials to criterion reflect acquisition of
correct responses to St or Snt. This is important because we
assume that preexposure to the St slows the acquisition of the
correct response to the PE St, but the trials-to-criterion mea-
sure does not assess this explicitly. It gives a measure of the
overall response accuracy following preexposure, which may
reflect an effect of preexposure on acquisition of response
accuracy to the PE St or the Snt. In this respect, the measure
is entirely ambiguous.
With this in mind, one may argue that there is an advantage
in studies that consider only response accuracy in the presence
of St (e.g., Gray et al., 2002; Gray et al., 2003; Gray et al.,
2001). By ignoring response accuracy to Snt, analysis of re-
sponse accuracy to St is unambiguous about the accuracy of
responding on St trials. However, unfortunately, there are prob-
lems here, too. In a design where participants should respond in
the presence of St and withhold responding in the presence of
Snt (as seen in all of the LI protocols discussed in this review),
the participant who responds in the presence of St selectively
and the participant who responds on every single trial indis-
criminately could have the same trials-to-criterion score. As
such, this measure is entirely uninformative about performance.
Response accuracy and reaction time Recent experiments
(i.e., since 2001) have moved away from the trials-to-
criterion measure, measuring the number of correct responses
(e.g., Tsakanikos and letter string tasks) or reaction time (e.g.,
windows and letter string tasks). While there are many advan-
tages to these measures, they have often been used without
any consideration of response accuracy on Snt trials. For in-
stance, Evans et al. (2007) measured the number of correct
responses in the letter string task, counting the total number of
times that participants responded in the presence of St. This
did not incorporate a measure of response accuracy in the
presence of Snt. As such, the data cannot discriminate be-
tween selective and indiscriminate responding.
Measuring reaction time provides an opportunity for trial-
by-trial analysis, to assess how changes in the rate of
responding emerge over Phase 2. However, most studies of
LI have collapsed the Phase 2 data to provide a single depen-
dent measure, for instance taking the mean or median reaction
time across the whole of the Phase 2 training. This precludes
analysis of differences in the rate of change in responding. As
LI is described as retarded performance following
preexposure, analysis of the rate of change in responding
should be central to understanding LI.
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Summary
Latent inhibition should be a simple effect of retarded task
performance following experience with a stimulus in the ab-
sence of a consequence. Despite this simplicity, few experi-
ments carried out with human participants have used suffi-
ciently simple protocols and included sufficient experimental
controls, in order to constrain the source of the retarded per-
formance to the effects of pre-exposure. Although there are
more than 59 experiments testing human LI, none provides a
purely unambiguous assessment of the effect of stimulus
preexposure on performance. Future research needs to return
to a simpler experimental design, ensuring that alternate ex-
planations for retarded performance are not possible. While
our review has highlighted several potential confounding fac-
tors, their effect on LI has not been explored systematically.
Without this systematic exploration, we are unable to rule out
several alternate explanations for apparent retardation follow-
ing preexposure, as we summarize below. We recommend the
following as a set of basic requirements for future tests of LI.
A simple Phase 1 task
From a practical perspective, the nature of the Phase 1 task
does not appear to have a dramatic influence on the effect of
preexposure. However, there are complications in interpreting
the effect that most Phase 1 tasks have on Phase 2 perfor-
mance. Many Phase 1 tasks have altered the LI design to a
learned irrelevance design (Le Pelley & Schmidt-Hansen,
2010; Schmidt-Hansen & Le Pelley, 2012), introduced possi-
ble negative priming (Escobar et al., 2003), or changed the
task to one of contingency learning (for further discussion see,
Le Pelley & Schmidt-Hansen, 2010; Msetfi et al., 2017;
Schmidt-Hansen & Le Pelley, 2012). Very few studies have
avoided these confounds, which leads to the disappointing
caution that most studies reporting human LI are ambiguous
in method and theoretical interpretation.
A few recent experiments have shown that simply requir-
ing participants to engage with the Phase 2 stimuli through
Phase 1 does not disrupt LI (Granger et al., 2016; Schmidt-
Hansen & Honey, 2014; Shrira & Kaplan, 2009; Tsakanikos
& Reed, 2004). Looking toward future research, this approach
provides an opportunity to test LI without biasing a partici-
pant’s attention toward or away from any particular stimuli,
limiting alternate explanation for the effect of preexposure.
Dissociate preexposure from relative novelty
Most tests assess LI as the difference in performance with a PE
St and an NPE St. However, the novel stimulus is usually
presented in a preexposed context, facilitating learning with
the novel stimulus (Pearce & Hall, 1980; Schmajuk et al.,
1996). Thus, the reported LI effect is actually a combination
of preexposure and relative novelty effects in which the rela-
tive contribution of each effect is unknown. Future research
needs to manipulate the relative novelty of the NPE St to
dissociate the contributions of preexposure and novelty to
the LI effect. Future assessments of LI can isolate the effect
of preexposure by including both preexposed and non-
preexposed nontarget stimuli to ensure that, at the start of
Phase 2, the non-preexposed target stimulus is not relatively
novel.
Measure the rate of change in behavior
Despite LI being described as a slow change in responding
following preexposure, few studies have analyzed the rate of
change in responding following preexposure, limiting our
ability to understand how preexposure influences perfor-
mance. Future research would benefit from trial-by-trial anal-
ysis to explore these interactions further. Also, using single
measures of LI oversimplifies the interpretation of the effect.
Instead, future studies need to report response accuracy across
all trial types and analyze how this changes over trials of
training.
Conclusion
As Lubow states, LI is a simple phenomenon (Lubow &
Gerwitz, 1995). Elegantly designed animal studies have pro-
vided empirical clarity that has allowed the LI literature to
play a key role in the development of modern learning theory
(e.g., Kruschke, 2001; Le Pelley, 2004; Mackintosh, 1975;
McLaren, Kaye, & Mackintosh, 1989; McLaren &
Mackintosh, 2000; Pearce & Hall, 1980; Pearce &
Mackintosh, 2010; Wagner, 1981). Animal studies of LI are
widely employed to examine disruptions in cognitive and be-
havioral flexibility, yet for this LI research to have the trans-
lational impact in human research, informing our understand-
ing of diversity in cognitive and behavioral flexibility, tests of
LI in humans require significantly more empirical control.
Achieving simplicity within human studies has been challeng-
ing. Despite the extensive use of LI in animal models of hu-
man mental health, we have yet to see conclusive evidence of
human LI, let alone a comprehensive understanding of the
psychological mechanisms underpinning the effect.
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